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THE NEW LOOKS IN LAW
MAURICE ROSENBERG*

A few years ago, Dr. I. I. Rabi, a Nobel laureate in physics, told
me at lunch that one of the big differences between law and science is
that, in his words, "In science we build bridges to the future; in law,
you build them to the past" I kept munching on my jello as I searched
for a retort,.or at least a response, and here I propose to report the
results of the quest to this point.
No doubt most of us would admit that the law has not until now
accented a future-oriented, look. This *is understandable, for in its
very nature law is reactive. It tends to focus on treating yesterday's
ills, not on preventing tomorrow's. That is probably what led Dr. Rabi
to his remark about "bridges to the past." That is what accounts for
other barbs, summed up in the jibe that law is like a bird which flies
backwards, because it does not care where it is going but wants to see
where it has been.
The time has arrived for this backwardness to stop. Looking ahead
may not prevent disaster, but failing to look ahead. will guarantee it.
Already, technology, population and human impatience have compressed
the space that separates random lunacy from general catastrophe to a
fearfully short distance. This planet has very little margin for error
if it is to survive for long. In these times anticipation is a mortal
necessity, and law must do its share.
Happily, there are signs of new perspectives for law-perspectives
that come from facing forward and looking outward; in contrast to
the traditional legal position that was to face backward and peer inward.
This change will have practical impact: it will increase law's capacity
to serve society. It will also have intellectual, impact: it will affect
the way law is taught, studied and thought about.
Perhaps the flavor of ,the change can be suggested in a wordthe word "findings." .Whereas in the past lawyers have been nearly
exclusively committed to "thinkings," they are now also interested in
findings. In this they share a general tendency of 41odern man. All
of us have become more and more dependent upon findings and facts
as science and the media flood our awareness of the world with torrents
of data, including quite a number that are correct.
Whether the subject is the trend in paid admissions at County
Stadium, the Dow-Jones stock averages, the health of the bald eagle
population, Mickey Mantle's lifetime slugging capacity, Teddy Kennedy's popularity, or your cousin's chances of getting into Princetonwhatever the subject, someone has some findings and data.
* Author and lecturer in law, presently teaching at Columbia University.
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As an aside, it is worth noticing that the data usually come to us
in the language of numbers, which is itself a pregnant datum for a
profession that has lived by words.
One result of this information revolution has been that people have
been freer to reject old wives' tales and assorted hand-me-down superstitions. Even the English World-is-Flat Society had to admit not
long ago after looking at snapshots from outer space that the earth
does have a roundish look. Now the members will have to revise
their geography a little, and maybe they will even touch up their history,
which I'm told recounts that Columbus left Spain with four ships, not
three. The Society reputedly holds that the fourth just kept sailing
when it got to the edge.
The information explosion has bred a healthy skepticism that cuts
into many of the ancient scabs of superstition that encrust the body of
civilized society, and has exposed the festering nonsense inside. Systematic inquiry has penetrated domains of human belief that have been
closed to critical examination as far back as history recalls.
This penetration is going ahead in law at accelerating speed and
is challenging many of law's easy assumptions about matters of social
fact. We are also witnessing a massive challenge to the law's values,
but this is not, in my opinion, based upon any systematic or coherent
inquiry. What it is based upon is a complex question that all of us
will be trying to answer for the rest of our lives.
At any rate, our concern this evening is with the way many of the
law's assumptions about matters of fact are coming under challenge.
One result will be the revision of legal rules and practices to reflect
the discarding of legal assumptions of the "world-is-flat" variety. A
more important result will be a shift in our manner of looking at law
and thinking about it. We will come under increasing pressure to embrace the scientific method as a necessary complement to the classical
legal method in our approach to our profession's work.
I see the law succumbing to the pressure and think the development is not only welcome but overdue. It will mean harder work,
for I believe it will call on us to master a radically different process
of intellectual justification-a new logic of explanation. And, no doubt,
in doing so we shall have to tear down a few old structures of legal
dogma-but they are shanties anyway, and no one will miss them.
Let us turn to a case that exemplifies the tension between the law's
penchant for assumption and science's approach to the investigation
of social reality.
Hawkins v. United States,' decided in 1958 in the U.S. Supreme
Court, is a squalid case to carry so lofty a theme, but it does. The Gov'358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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ernment charged James Hawkins with transporting a 17-year-old girl
from Arkansas to Oklahoma for immoral purposes in violation of the
Mann Act. Actually, she had lived in Dogpatch, Oklahoma. The District judge took the sordid business very much to heart and after
Hawkins was found guilty sentenced him to five years imprisonment.
In the Supreme Court Mr. Hawkins complained bitterly that his
wife had been used as a witness against him at the trial, in violation
of the common law rule that immemorially excluded one spouse's testimony against the other.
The conviction was unanimously reversed. Justice Black wrote for
the Court in a fashion that is a model of the law's mind at work in
the classical manner. He declared that "reason and experience" require
the Court to uphold the rule barring the lady from testifying.
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband
or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at
stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster
family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and
children, but for the benefit of the public as well. Such a belief
has never been unreasonable and is not now ....

But the Gov-

ernment argues that the fact a husband or wife testifies against
the other voluntarily is strong indication that the marriage is
already gone. Doubtless this is often true. But not all marital
flare-ups in which one spouse wants to hurt the other are
permanent. The widespread success achieved by courts throughout the country in conciliating family differences is a real indication that some apparently- broken homes can be saved ...
Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings
would, we
2
think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage.
Justice Black went on to fortify his thinking man's position by
asserting that to abandon the exclusionary rule would violate the "persistent instincts" of centuries of the common law. 3
Mr. Justice Stewart joined his brothers in voting for reversal, but
he could not accept the majority's fears that marital bliss would vanish
if the spousal privilege were not enforced. He pointed out that 19 states
and England had repealed or substantially modified the rule and,
picking up Black's phrase, he said: "Surely 'reason and experience'
require that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions, perhaps
naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the
4
interests of domestic tranquility."
He urged, in effect, that there was a better way to tune in on
society's experience than through the seat of the judge's hunches or
thinkings:
2

Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).

3 Id. at 79.
4Id. at 81-82.
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Before assuming that a change in the present rule would work
such a wholesale disruption of domestic felicity as the Court's
opinion implies, it would be helpful to know the, experience in
those jurisdictions where the rule had been abandoned or modified.5
Is Stewart not right? Is it not clear that if the court's decision
rests on the supposititious impact of a legal rule upon human behavior, and it has empirical sources of evidence bearing on that issue,
it ought not to disregard them? The practice of relying on intuition to
resolve fact questions is what makes Russian roulette so risky a
business.
Perhaps Justice Black did not mean to be taken seriously when he
invoked experience to prove that the husband-wife privilege must not
be discarded. Perhaps his true reliance was on a value reason-that
it is simply indecent and unworthy to permit a wife to propel her man
to prison by testimony against him in a criminal case. If so, Justice
Black would have served justice as well, and law better, if he had
been frank in saying that. Courts ought to keep their reasons aboveboard, not conceal them in unverified assumptions. Otherwise the
public will soon come to believe that the law's values are no more
trustworthy than its disproven assumptions. And when public confidence in law falters, the society is in trouble.
The point I make here is that in legal definitions-whether by
courts or legislatures-values and assumptions are both involved, and
they ought to be separately identified and separately considered.
"But not so fast," you will say. "How do you propose to go about
comparing the level of marital bliss in the states that have or have
not the spousal privilege that Hawkins was so keen for?" Is the best
technique to use questionnaires and interview surveys asking married
people about their felicity indicators in the "have" states compared
with the "have not" states? Is comparing divorce rates the way to
find out? Shall we ask the social scientists to rig up a controlled experiment on domestic tranquility? Would it be relevant to find out
how often, in fact, one mate does testify against another in criminal
cases in the 19 "have not" states?
In other words, granting it would be helpful to check out Black's
assumption, as Stewart urges, how could it be done?
That is not an easy question, and it deserves more than an off-hand
answer. In my opinion the state of the art of survey research is well
enough advanced so that some useful evidence could be obtained about
the impact of repeal of the Hawkins privilege if the law seriously wants
and needs the evidence. Even if my facetious suggested questions are
5Id. at 82, n.4.
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not on the right track, there are two points to be made before we
write off the venture as not worth the effort.
First, please notice that the need to specify criteria for systematic
study of marital tranquility, makes lawyers think harder about what
Justice Black meant by a phrase that rolled so trippingly off his tongue.
Second, even if lawyers prove to be capable of specifying satisfactorily the questions they want answered and find that present-day
social science cannot deliver responses with enough valid and credible
evidence to help, that is no reason to give up-on scientific research.
This kind of, empirical inquiry is still an infant industry, and .with
infants, a certain amount of patience is healthy. A story -goes that
Faraday was explaining to a friend a device that in the end embodied
one of his basic discoveries on electromagnetism. The friend asked,
"Yes, but what use is it?" "No use," said Faraday, "it's like a baby."
Never mind the immaturity and imperfections of the science of
social inquiry. Lawyers will want to understand and use it, with increasing urgency. It offers a way to observe the world, outside-sometimes to gauge the impact of law in action; sometimes to determine
the nature and extent of colliding purposes that law must take account of.
The science of empirical inquiry offers lawyers plenty of scope
for stimulating intellectual activity: in formulating the problem for
research, in designing indicators or criteria, and in interpreting data
from the field.
Earlier I said that the use by lawyers of scientific methods of testing social experience will involve us in a different kind of intellectual
activity and that this will complement the traditional legal methods.
Let me spell that out.
The intellectual qualities that legal method accents are power of
analysis, care in making distinctions, brilliance in dialectic, imaginativeness in synthesis, ability with rhetoric. When the legal scholar
writes an article or treatise, he. generally offers it to the market place
of ideas with the following sort of warranty: "I have consulted the
authorities I deem relevant, have analyzed and synthesized their essential contents and have arrived at my theory or conclusion. My analysis, reasoning and argument are all set out and should persuade you
to my way of thinking. Have I not achieved a brilliant insight?"
Scientists use a different process of justification-at least, in the
gathering, assembling and interpreting, of data prior to the place where
they begin to argue for the significance or meaning of their findings.
One may be bent on merely describing a segment of reality. Another
may be out to test a previously developed hypothesis about causality
or correlation in the form, "If X, then Y." (For example, if policemen
may not interrogate at station houses without Miranda-style warnings,
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the rate of convictions for crime will fall. If news media print accusations and statements about defendants before trial, the impartiality
of the jury will be jeopardized. If pretrial discovery is conducted, the
case is more likely to settle without trial. The latter hypothesis is
dubious on the basis of a nationwide survey of Federal pretrial discovery, conducted by the Columbia Project for Effective Justice.) 6
In conducting the research to test his hypothesis, the scientist follows systematic and institutionalized procedures of investigation. These
prescribe, usually with some rigor, how he must go about observing
the universe, population or subject of his inquiry. If his research is
quantitative and the population too large for total embrace, he must
sample. There are known and generally accepted procedures for sampling, based on probability principles, with ranges of potential error
that are understood and allowed for.
With the data in hand, the scientist presents and analyzes them,
once more according to generally accepted procedures and rules. The
effort is to objectify the process by which relevant materials are assembled and analyzed. When he has performed these steps, the scientist throws down a challenge quite different from the lawyer's. He
says, "Go thou and do likewise in collecting and assembling the data.
Follow the systematics of observation and recording and the rules for
interpretation of the data. You will reach the same results I reached,
I promise you."
Science insists on results that are verifiable by others. So the investigator must make tracks that his colleagues can follow or replicate independently. This places large importance on the how of research and not alone on the what or the product.
Lawyers have no fondness for the question of how research is conducted. Everyone knows how to use the indices, digests, and the rest
of the library. There is no point in including discussions of methodology in a law review article. Until very lately, you would not have
found in the reviews any discussions of methodology of the kind that
abound in the social science literature. Scientists care about heuristics;
lawyers usually are turned away by it.
I do not pretend that the legal and the scientific styles of thought

and justification never meet, but that in general any meeting that
occurs takes place on the lawyer's home ground and involves their
shared practices in using speculation, logic, inference, judgment and
other reflective intellectual processes that are more characteristic of
doctrinal manipulation than data gathering. When law teachers have
been saying all these years that legal education seeks to teach students
"to think like lawyers," they have meant it literally. What I submit
6 Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in PretrialDiscovery, 48 F.R.D. 479, 488-89 (1968);
W.

GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

91-100 (1968).
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here is that we must also teach them to observe and find out like
scientists, or we shall not be doing our job for them or for the law.
In short, legal education will have to embrace, as a complement to
legal method, the scientific logic of explanation or justification. Most
law teachers will find themselves quite ignorant of scientific method
and its use in social research and will want to learn about them.
Happily, they have a splendid opportunity under a special program
recently set up under-the acronym SSMILE (Social Science Methods
in Legal Education), co-sponsored by the Association of American
Law Schools and the Law and Society Association. Each summer
since 1967, a month-long institute has been held at the University of
Denver College of Law for about 20 law professors, with the aim of
immersing them in the theory and practice of social research.
Almost before the teachers can become prepared to teach them,
programs and courses on "law and society" or "law and social research" are starting to sprout at undergraduate levels in law schools.
The movement toward these subjects will doubtless get into full swing
after the December, 1969, annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. About 2000 of the nation's law teachers will there
take part in a many-sided program built around the theme, "Contemporary Social Research, the Law and the Law Schools." I expect that
the law professors will depart from the meeting with a keen sense of
the need to master the systematics of social research about law.
In stressing the utility of social science, I do not mean to neglect
its limits. Much of its literature strikes me as excessively concerned
with social and moral philosophizing, with captious attacks on various
of our imperfect institutions, and with generalized hair-tearing about
the inhumanity of man. Such sport may qualify as social, but is it
science?
In my opinion, the attribute that gives social scientists their greatest value is their capacity, concededly limited at this stage, to explain
and perhaps to predict social phenomena. Prediction is the applied art
of anticipating, and anticipation is the mortal necessity I mentioned
at the outset. The social scientists' greatest failing has been their eagerness to prescribe medicaments they have not tested for social maladies
they have not fully investigated, let alone fully understood. They cannot hope to enjoy public confidence as major resources of needed
knowledge if they respond with their predilections when asked for
their findings.
In today's restless world, the stakes that ride on law's success in
managing social problems are large. And there is one need above all
that shadows law whenever it ventures to try to improve the human
condition. It was expressed two years ago by the President's Crime
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Commission, which carefully surveyed the administration of criminal
justice in this nation and concluded that there are many needs in this
7
area, but of all of them the greatest is the "need to know."
Lawyers are by nature and temperament problem-solvers. They are
more anxious to eradicate social evils than to fathom their underlying
dynamics. But we are all becoming aware, as we face one crisis after
another in society, that one simply cannot apply knowledge one does not
have, no matter how urgent the need for it. The first priority is to get
the knowledge.
In a mass society, a handicraft system of investigating law-related
social problems is no more useful than a handicraft system of producing
automobiles. When the issue was whether a person who promised to
answer for the debt of another should be held liable without a writing,
a court could decide the issue without ,going outside the system of
values that appeared in the decided cases. But if the issue is whether
increasing the penalty for using heroin will curb its use by the young,
nothing in the cases and no amount of gazing inward for moral imperatives will provide the answers.
Today, assuring the internal symmetry of law is not our great concern. Our concern is with the rules in operation and the law in action.
We have to know how effective law is in relation to the people and the
problems it is meant to address. We have to know enough to write laws
that will look ahead. We must anticipate in law. We must build bridges
to the future.

7President's Commission On Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY 273 (1967).

